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Abstract 
 
China, the largest carbon dioxide emitter in the world, has faced environmental pressures 
both internationally and domestically over the last ten years. In early 2011, the Chinese 
government approved a carbon emissions trading program in seven cities and provinces, and 
started planning a national emissions trading framework. This thesis reviews these pilot 
programs and examines the issues that underlie them. Drawing lessons from the U.S. Acid 
Rain Program, the European Union’s ETS, and California’s CAT, the three largest emissions 
trading frameworks in the world, I find that: (1) lack of trades in China’s pilot programs is a 
consequence of permit over allocation; (2) lack of stringent regulations and penalties have 
caused low compliance rates and biased data quality; and (3) the secondary market has low 
liquidity and permit prices do not imply true values. Based on these results, I suggest using 
benchmarking and auctions instead of free distribution to allocate permits to prevent 
loopholes and over-allocation. Further, I suggest that the regulatory agency should enforce 
stringent rules on quality data and encourage transparency by creating a publicly trackable 
online database. 
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Executive Summary 
In 2013, the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 5th Assessment Report for 
the first time admitted that the increase in carbon emissions caused by greenhouse gases 
would be directly harmful to people's health and quality of life. The increase in carbon 
emissions is due to the massive use of fossil fuels by humans. High energy consumption 
means elevated carbon emissions.  
 China's political and economic reform since the early 1980s have resulted in rapid 
economic development, population growth, and household income rise. The demand for 
energy and resources has increased dramatically as well. As a result, China surpassed the 
U.S. to become the largest carbon dioxide emitter in the world in 2007 (Vidal & Adam, 
2007). Both China’s international trading partners and domestic citizens awared this issue 
and kept asking for changes. As pressures started to mount both domestically and 
internationally, China quickly acted and pledged to cut its carbon intensity by 40 to 45 
percent by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels during the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in 
2009. In early 2011, China approved an emissions-trading program in seven cities and 
provinces in response to the pledge. All pilots started running by the end of 2013.  
 The Pilots Program is an emissions trading system. Firms or industries that emits 
carbon dioxide will join the program across seven pilots. Firms will obtain their emission 
rights, which are permits, to emit carbon dioxide. Permits are tradable in the secondary 
market. Every year, the total emission of the system, which is called the cap, will decrease so 
that firms have to find ways to reduce their emissions, or buy permits from other firms to 
meet the emission obligation. There are penalties to punish violators.   
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 My research asks: What is the current status of the Seven Pilots Program? What are 
the policy challenges for the seven pilots, and what could the Seven Pilots Program learn 
from other emissions trading programs? 
 To respond to these questions, I first explore the history of emissions reduction 
policies in China. I examine the national Five-Year Plans to trace the evolution of emissions 
reduction policies and how China shifted its focus on targeted emissions. Next, I focus on 
China’s political structure and policy innovations. Understanding them helps to interpret 
policymakers’ intentions. I also thoroughly analyze the policy details of the pilots program. 
 Then, I explore how other regimes implemented similar policies. From the several 
successful emissions reduction schemes, I chose the U.S. Acid Rain Program, EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme, and California Cap-and-Trade Program because they are large frameworks 
and have had significant emissions reduction results. I first compare the structure of these 
frameworks and then turn my focus to their allocation methods, enforcement mechanisms, 
and secondary market and price volatility. I review the literature in these areas and draw 
examples of how these policy designs have resulted significant outcomes. After reviewing 
these policies, I turn my attention to the Pilots Program.  
 Why focus on allocation method, enforcement mechanisms, and secondary market 
and price volatility? Allocation method is the way to distribute permits to firms. Insufficient 
allocation method will result over-allocation, meaning firms obtained more permits than they 
were emitting. This will fail the emissions trading system. Enforcement mechanisms are also 
important measures for an emissions trading system. Without sufficient enforcement 
mechanisms, firms will not meet their emission reduction goal and they will neglect the 
whole system, which will fail the system. The secondary market and price volatility are also 
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important indicators for an emissions trading system. Price volatility is the flow of the 
permits prices in the secondary market. It indicates if the secondary markets functions well or 
not. Most importantly, price volatility also reflects the marginal abatement costs.  
 My analysis focuses on three specific aspects of the program: allocation method, 
enforcement mechanisms, and secondary market and price volatility. In order to analyze the 
problems of the permit price and price volatility, I obtained the permits trading data, 
including permits price and permits trading transactions, since late 2013. My analysis also 
draws on the political factors that have challenged the seven pilots in local-level government.  
 Out of this analysis, I find that: 
 Distributing permits freely to program participants has caused over-
allocation in all of the pilots. This is due to a lack of historical emissions data 
and an overestimated cap. As a result, the permit prices in the secondary 
market remain low in most pilots. For example, the Chongqing pilot’s permit 
price has fluctuated between 10 Yuan (about 1.5 USD) and 20 Yuan (about 
2.85 USD) in last four years. Overall, over-allocation has cost carbon prices in 
most pilot projects in the 20 Yuan (2.85 USD) range most of the time. 
 The Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) process is chaotic 
across all pilots. All emissions data were not disclosed to the public and firms 
have found loopholes to report biased emissions data. In many cases, the 
emissions data are shown differently from the official statistics and third party 
reports. The lack of sufficient monitoring instruments, reporting mechanisms, 
and stringent verification regulations have prevented the success of the pilot 
projects. 
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 There is no secondary market management across all pilots, and price 
volatility has shown low market liquidity. The Beijing market only traded 2.6 
percent of its total permits in last four years. Due to the over-allocation and 
lack of sufficient MRV, all pilots have low transaction volumes and most 
firms hold their permits and never trade with others. 
 Political incentive is an important support to the pilot programs. 
Unfortunately, studies have shown that city cadres and officials often seek 
economic growth as their prioritized target so that they have higher chances to 
be promoted. Increasing environmental amenities tends to decrease economic 
growth at the local level, and therefore environmental investments were 
commonly neglected or unprioritized by the city officials. As a result, the pilot 
projects lack political support at the local level. 
The results of my work show that the Pilots Program needs significant structural adjustments 
and policy revisions. Even though the pilot projects have demonstrated the potential to 
reduce carbon emissions, these are not enough for China to meet its Copenhagen pledge. 
Therefore, my thesis provides the following policy recommendations for the pilot programs: 
 The allocation method should change to benchmark and auction. Because 
there are insufficient historical emissions data and monitoring processes in 
China, using a universal industry standard would help to promote emissions 
reductions and compliance rate. Auctioning would be a supplement tool to 
help manage the permit price and distribute more permits to the participants. 
 The regulatory agency should create an online database to ensure data 
quality and data transparency. Using this database, the public could then trace 
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the emissions reductions and help to monitor any violations. All other 
emissions trading programs, such as APR, ETS, and CAT, have similar 
mechanisms to ensure data quality and compliance.  
 A strict penalty system is also necessary. Currently, most of the pilots 
have chaotic penalty systems and the fines are so low that many firms prefer 
to pay them instead of reducing their emissions. All pilots should connect with 
a legal system and create mechanisms to sufficiently punish violators. 
In its most recent Five Year Plan, the Chinese government pledged to establish a national 
emissions trading program before 2020. Even though China’s pilot program faces significant 
structural and political challenges, it represents a serious effort by China to reduce its carbon 
dioxide emissions. If the regulatory agency is able to meet these challenges and keep the 
framework running efficiently, China’s national carbon emissions trading system will be a 
relevant goal in the next three to five years. 
  
1 
Introduction 
Over the last two decades, China has experienced rapid economic growth, which has 
generated an unprecedented improvement in the standard of living of its citizens. However, 
this prosperity has not been without cost; pollution in China has been raising serious 
concerns about quality of life. In 2006, 13 of the 20 most-polluted cities in the world were in 
China (World Bank, 2006). Public concerns about air pollution were first raised by an air 
quality report from the US Embassy in Beijing in early 2012 (Yu, 2013), which indicated that 
in the local Beijing area particulate matter levels were far above international norms (Yu, 
2013).1 In several days of January 2012, Beijing reached 700 micrograms per cubic meter 
(units? PM 2.5?), which is a level that can be considered extremely hazardous (Tang, 2013).2 
According to other reports, Shanghai, the economic center of China, had an average 
particulate matter of 60.7 microgram per cubic meter in 2013, which is more than double the 
international safety standard (Greenpeace, 2014). 
The driving forces behind the skyrocketing economy and decreasing air quality in 
China are coal and other fossil fuels (Ohshita & Ortolano, 2006). Coal not only releases large 
carbon dioxide emissions but also emits other toxic particles into air when combusted. Coal 
is largely used in heating systems, electricity generation, and steel production. With more 
than 1.3 billion people, China consumes nearly 50 percent of global annual coal production, 
which accounts for a large amount of carbon emissions and environmental degradation (U.S. 
and World Population Clock, 2016; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013) and has 
made China the world’s largest carbon emitter in the world, contributing about 25 percent of 
                                                
1 Particulate matter can cause asthma and bronchitis and can eventually lead to premature death (Rasschou-
Nielsen et al., 2013). 
2 The international safety guidelines for particulate matter, which was set by the World Health Organization, is 
25 micrograms per cubic meter (Yu 2013). 
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global carbon emissions in 2012 (Liu, 2015). As Figure 1 shows, the major fuel source of 
energy consumption in China is coal, which explains poor air quality and large carbon 
emissions. 
 
   
Figure 1: China’s energy production and consumption structure in 2013 (Xu et al., 2015) 
China has responded to these environmental concerns by enacting various policies through 
the last three Five-Year Plans.3 In 2006, in its 11th Five-Year plan, China aimed to reduce its 
sulfur dioxide emissions by 10 percent and install flue-gas desulphurization technology on 
most thermal power plants by 2010 (Schreifels et al., 2012), which was successfully achieved. 
In the 12th Five-Year Plan, which began in 2011, the targets were expanded to 8 percent and 
10 percent emission cuts for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide, and 16 percent and 17 percent 
reductions in energy and carbon dioxide intensity (The State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2011). Solar and wind facilities have increased significantly and China 
has become the largest solar panel producer and consumer in the world; nearly 25 percent of 
global solar panels were installed in China in 2015 (Fehrenbacher, 2015). According to 
                                                
3 The national FYP outlines a series of social and economic development policies and initiatives for the entire 
country (Zhang et al., 2012). It is a document planned by the CCP to set targets for the next five years and to 
signal to lower level officials within China the intentions of the party’s top leadership (Zhang et al., 2012). 
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reports, coal use in China peaked in 2014 and started declining by 3.7 percent in 2015 
(Carrington, 2016). 
Most importantly, China pledged to cut its carbon intensity by 40 to 45 percent by 
2020 relative to its 2005 levels during the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in 2009. As 
a result, China started to set an energy-intensity reduction goal in the FYPs and seriously 
planned to reduce emissions. The low-carbon city project was launched in five provinces and 
eight cities in 2010 and later expanded to 29 provinces and cities in 2012. Aligned with the 
low-carbon development in these cities and provinces, carbon-trading schemes was brought 
on the table in 2011 and approved by the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) in the same year. 
In early 2012, China established emissions trading systems in seven provinces and 
cities: the political center Beijing, “the business hub of Shanghai, the sprawling industrial 
municipalities of Tianjin and Chongqing, the manufacturing center of Guangdong province, 
Hubei province (home of Wuhan Iron and Steel), and Shenzhen, the special economic zone 
across the border from Hong Kong (Zhang, 2015, p.3).” In last three years, the seven pilot 
projects traded 49 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions and auctioned another 17 
million metric tons, which generated 1.2 billion yuan (about 200 million USD) between 2014 
and 2015 (China Carbon, 2015). 
Deeming these seven pilot projects an experiment, the central government planned to 
deploy a national Emissions Trading System (ETS) between 2017 and 2020, which will 
involve 11 major industries and more than 7,000 firms (“National Carbon,” 2016). This is 
part of China’s aim to reduce its emissions by 60 to 65 percent, relative to its 2005 levels, by 
2030 (China Economic Times, 2016). As China tried to mitigate air pollution and regulate 
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industries that produce massive carbon emissions, China’s next step, a national Emission 
Trade System, will be the key to determine whether China can meet its 2030 goal. 
This thesis aims to provide guidance for the design of the national Emissions Trading 
System by first taking stock of the existing regional emissions trading systems and draw 
lessons from other emissions trading systems around the world with a focus on the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). To this end, I review the literature on existing emissions 
trading systems, summarize the status of the regional pilot carbon emissions trading systems 
in China, and draw comparative lessons, which I use to make recommendations for China’s 
emerging national emissions trading system. 
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Chapter 2: Background, Policy Innovation, and the seven pilot projects 
Emissions Trading Experiment 
2.1 History of Developing an Emissions Trading Scheme in China 
A primary impetus behind the emission reduction plans that began in 1996 was participation 
in the Kyoto Protocol (Sun, 2012). Secondarily, rapid urbanization, industrialization and 
energy consumption caused air quality to fall significantly in many of its cities, raising 
concerns over quality of life and human health costs (Schreifels et al., 2012). In 1996, the 
Chinese National People’s Congress passed plans to protect the environment and set goals 
for 2010 (Sun, 2012). Despite the adoption of this new strategy, actual progress remained 
limited because the government was primarily focused on economic growth. The focus on 
economic growth sent signals to lower levels of government that created low level of 
implementing regulations in cities and towns (Schreifels et al., 2012). It is not surprising, 
therefore, that by the end of 9th and 10th Five-Year Plans, China had not met most of its 
environmental targets. 
Table. 1. Five-Year Plan Timeline 
Five-year plan Timeline 
 9th 1996-2000 
10th 2001-2005 
11th 2006-2010 
12th 2011-2015 
13th 2016-2020 
Source: Organized by author 
In 2001, emission reduction targets were set at all levels of the government. By setting these 
targets, the government hoped that the local and city levels would see significant pollution 
reductions. However, the plan failed and total emissions increased 28 percent during the 10th 
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Five-Year Plan (Schreifels et al., 2012). Sulfur dioxide emissions, for example, increased 5.5 
percent annually during the 10th Five-Year Plan (Schreifels et al., 2012). 
Scholars have identified several reasons for the failure of the emission reduction plan, 
including lax enforcement, high cost, lack of technology, and internal politics. All levels of 
government did not strictly follow the policies (Schreifels et al., 2012). In addition, many 
factories were unwilling to install technologies to reduce emissions because of the high costs 
(Schreifels et al., 2012). The electoral cycle in early 2000 also delayed the environmental 
strategies (Schreifels et al., 2012). More importantly, the evaluation for local-level 
governmental promotion was largely based on economic achievements, which did not 
motivate local officials to promote emission reductions (Schreifels et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
emission reports lack accountability, and there is no penalty for failing to enforce the policy 
or violating environmental laws (Schreifels et al., 2012). Even though the 10th Five-Year 
Plan failed, however, it established a general structure for the system and general guidelines 
for future regulations. 
Many scholars believe that the third stage of the national Five-Year Plan got off to a 
good start and that the 11th Five-Year Plan has been very successful (CITE THESE 
SCHOLARS HERE). Many emissions reduction goals were met. For example, Chemical 
Oxygen Demand (COD) emissions were reduced by 12.45 percent and sulfur dioxide 
emission were reduced by 14.29 percent (National Energy Administration, 2011). The third 
stage began in 2006 with the 11th Five-Year Plan and is still ongoing. After the failure of 
most policies during the 10th Five-Year Plan, the Chinese government put greater emphasis 
on sulfur dioxide reduction goals (Schreifels et al., 2012). Schreifels et al. (2012) argue that 
the success of the 11th Five-Year Plan was due to better political instruments, including 
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“binding agreements with provincial governors, performance audits, ... and stronger 
enforcement of existing laws by the central government,” which allowed the sulfur dioxide 
reduction goal to be met at the end the 11th Five-Year Plan (Schreifels et al., 2012, p.781). At 
the end of 2010, China reduced its sulfur dioxide emissions 10 percent below 2005 levels and 
installed flue-gas desulphurization technology on 86 percent of thermal power plant capacity 
(Schreifels et al., 2012). 
  In the National Environmental Protection 12th Five-Year Plan, the new targets were 
further expanded to 8 percent and 10 percent emission cuts for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen 
oxide and 16 percent and 17 percent reductions in energy and carbon dioxide intensity (The 
State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). Furthermore, the plan promoted 
more policies and technologies. For example, wind and solar electricity generation capacities 
increased at a high rate, around 72 percent and 55 percent annually, during the 11th and 12th 
Five-Year Plan periods (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). 
In addition to these factors, the clean development mechanism (CDM), which was 
initially created by the UNFCCC in 1996, also gradually began to play an important role in 
early 2000. By April 2012, China became the major player in the CDM market with 51 
percent of all registered CDM projects worldwide (UNFCCC, 2016). Even though CDM 
projects were relatively successful in China, there were no other instruments that could help 
to regulate carbon emissions at that time. The government was mainly focusing on regulating 
sulfur dioxide. 
 Emissions trading systems were added to the policy mix during the 11th and 12th Five-
Year Plan. A cap, the total emission, is often set when implementing the emissions trading 
system. It normally decreases annually so that total emissions decrease overtime (EDF, 2016; 
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European Commission, 2016; UNICAO, 2016). Companies who emit carbon dioxide have to 
buy or trade permits and cannot emit above the permitted amount (EDF, 2016; European 
Commission, 2016; UNICAO, 2016). Since the total emissions fall and fewer permits are 
issued, companies are incentivized to innovate emission reduction technologies or switch to 
renewable energy to meet the regulation (EDF, 2016; European Commission, 2016; 
UNICAO, 2016). This market-based instrument is efficient in reducing pollution and eases 
the tension between economic growth and environmental sustainability. Moreover, since coal 
combustion is the main source of air pollution, limiting air pollution emissions unavoidably 
leads to a decrease in the use of fossil fuels. A more resource-efficient and environmentally 
friendly development pathway can then be achieved. 
The Copenhagen Pledge pushed China further to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions 
in 2009. In the following year, the 12th Five-Year Plan was established and the reduction of 
carbon emissions became the priority goal (Sun et al., 2016). Low-carbon development zones 
were designated and developed in five provinces and eight cities by NDRC (National 
Development and Reform Commission) (Sun et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2014). These zones 
were created as an initial test to use a market mechanism to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions. And, cities and provinces in these zones are mandated to create their own 
strategies and emission reduction goals (Liu et al., 2015). 
In 2011, pilot programs on carbon-trading were established in seven provinces and 
cities after they received official approval by the NDRC (Zhang et al., 2014). These pilot 
projects are the testing ground for the national emissions trading scheme after 2016. As 
required by law, all pilot projects are self-mandated, meaning that pilot projects may 
determine how carbon-emission targets would be allocated, how much funds may support the 
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carbon-trade market, and how to implement the plans in the region after they received 
approval from the State Council (Liu et al., 2015). All pilot projects may also decide the 
means of capping, and selected capped sectors themselves (Liu et al., 2015). From June 2013 
to June 2014, all seven pilot projects began full operation and estimates have shown that 
about 1 billion tons of carbon dioxide are regulated (Liu et al., 2015), with the program in 
Guangdong becoming the second-largest emissions trading scheme globally after the EU 
ETS. 
 
2.2 The Political Structure and Policy Innovation 
In order to better understand these developments, it is important to be familiar with the 
Chinese political structure, and how these policy innovations came into effect. 
 
2.2.1 China’s Political Structure 
Many western scholars have studied China’s political structure and have all agreed that 
China follows Leninism patterns (CITE THEM), where the Communist party remains as the 
only mandated authority in the nation and creates an elite class to support its legitimacy. 
Therefore, the unique government structure and political hierarchy had been created to 
demonstrate the Communist party’s authority. In such a system, the government and party 
are separated entities but are simultaneously tightly connected. 
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Figure 2: China National Level Political Power Structure. Source: Organized by author.  
 
Figure 2 shows the political structure of China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
remains the authority over the State Council and has direct control of the military. The State 
Council is the government that people refer to most of time. For example, the State Council 
regulates the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), the national 
environmental administration. The CCP’s role is to manage personnel within the government. 
CCP has the power to promote or demote governmental officials. The State Council is the 
entity that regulates daily matters and governs the country. In other words, CCP governs the 
State Council, or the government, and the government governs people. Therefore, the State 
Council is the place that normally generates policy. 
 Then, what is the structure and relationship of the State Council in all levels of 
government? Here is an example of the hierarchy structure in the State Council. 
Communist	  Party	  
State	  Council	   State	  Central	  Military	  Commission	   Supreme	  People's	  Court	   Supreme	  People's	  Procuratorate	  
State	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  Vice	  President	  
Party	  and	  State	  Central	  Military	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Figure 3: Administrative Structure. Source: Organized by author. 
 
The State Council regulates SEPA and lower levels of government. SEPA often generates 
policies and the provincial EPB (Environmental Protection Bureau) will implement these 
policies under the oversight of SEPA. Then, the provincial EPB will acknowledge the 
municipal EPB to implement policies at the city level. Policies flow vertically in the State 
Council. Horizontal relationships were also established between the same levels of 
government. For example, the municipal EPB must report to the municipal government and 
the mayor. 
 
2.2.2 Policy Innovation 
 
The idea that China’s bureaucracy is fragmented is not new. Western scholars have defined 
fragmented authoritarianism to explain policy innovation in China (Lieberthal & Lampton, 
1992; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988). Fragmented authoritarianism emerged  because (?) the 
current Chinese bureaucracy has left spaces for bargaining to generate policies (Lieberthal & 
The	  State	  Council	  Structure	  
The	  State	  Council	  
Provincial	  Government 
Municipal	  Government	  
SEPA	  
Provincial	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Municipal	  EPB	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Lampton, 1992; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988). The idea is that the responsibility of each 
department in the government distracts bureaucratic decision-making power, creating 
consensus bargaining and leading to a long-term progressive policy-making process 
(Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988). 
As a result, local governments often take their own initiatives in defiance of the 
central directive and often form tensions between the center and local government. This was 
due to the vertical and horizontal relationship within the Chinese government. Local leaders 
can resolve disputes and mediate interests from vertical hierarchies and other institutions to 
advocate his or her own interests. As a result, policies may not be implemented at the 
municipal level. Even if the policy went through local channels, municipal leaders have the 
autonomy to find ways to prioritize other projects and policies, which meet his or her 
interests. 
 
2.3 The Seven Pilot Programs 
China began to develop an emissions reduction framework as part of its agenda ever since it 
started to reform environmental protection policies. The Seven Pilots Program proposal was 
approved in 2010. By the end of 2013, all pilot projects were implemented and started 
trading permits. Since then, all participants in the seven pilot projects must commit emission 
reduction goals, and the compliance dates are in middle of each year. Each pilot project has a 
slightly different compliance date, but overall it is in June or July. Here are the locations and 
details for the seven pilot projects’ emission-trading scheme. 
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Figure. 4. Location of the 7 pilot projects. Source: Organized by author. 
 
2.3.1 Trading Period and Emission Target 
The emission targets are unclear in most pilot projects. However, all pilot projects have 
committed to reduce carbon intensity. For example, Beijing will reduce its carbon intensity 
by 10 percent from 2013 to 2015, and Guangdong Province will reduce its carbon intensity 
by 19 percent in the same period. 
 
2.3.2 Emission Type and Emission Threshold 
Currently, all pilot projects only regulate carbon dioxide emissions. No other type of gas was 
included in the scope. In terms of emission threshold, firms that emit more than 10,000 tons 
of carbon dioxide annually between 2009 and 2011 must participate in the regional pilot 
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projects. For example, firms that emit more than 20,000 tons per year from listed sectors in 
2010 or 2011 must participate in the Shanghai pilot. 
 
2.3.3 Coverage and Baseline Years 
All pilot projects have covered power and the iron and steel sectors, since these two sectors 
generate the most carbon dioxide. Sectors such as heating, chemical production, and cement 
are also included in most pilot projects. The baseline year is mostly between 2009 and 2011 
across all pilot projects. 
 
2.3.4 Allocation Method  
All pilot projects used the historical emission data from 2009 to 2011 and distributed permits 
freely to participants. Only Shanghai applies auctioning as an alternative method, and only 
small portions of permits were auctioned. All other pilot projects stated that they plan to use 
auctioning method in the future. 
 
2.3.5 Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification 
Firms must provide an emissions report to the regulatory agency annually. All pilot projects 
required a third-party verifier to verify the emission report from each participant. Hubei and 
Chongqing pilot projects only require MRV procedures for emitters, which consume more 
than 8,000 tons of coal each year. 
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2.3.6 Offsets, Borrowing/Banking, and Penalties 
Firms that have or are currently involved with a CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) 
project are allowed to use Chinese Certified Emission Reductions (CCER) offsets. It limits 
up to 10 percent in most pilot projects. No borrowing is allowed but banking can be used in 
all pilot projects. Violators will be penalized with criminal sanctions. Only Hubei and 
Shanghai pilot projects have announced a penalty price. The rest of the pilot projects did not 
provide any further information. 
The next chapter discusses the drivers of success and how China can draw lessons 
from other emissions trading systems.
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Chapter 3: Drivers of Success in Emissions Trading Systems 
Currently, there are many well-running emission-trading programs around the world, such as 
EU ETS, RGGI and California CAT. Even though these emission-trading systems have 
different system structures and methods, the fundamental goal for all of them is simple: 
reduce carbon dioxide and other related emissions. This section will first provide a structural 
comparison of the U.S. Acid Rain Program, EU ETS, and California CAT. Then, it will dive 
into three fundamental sectors of these emission-trading systems: initial allocating permits, 
reinforcement mechanisms, and secondary market and price management. 
 
3.1 Current Emission-Trading System Structure 
3.1.1 The U.S. Acid Rain Program 
The U.S. Acid Rain Program (ARP), the first large-scale emission-trading program in the 
United States, was designed to reduce the risks of acid rain in the 1990s. The primary targets 
for this program were coal burning power plants so that they could trade emission permits to 
reduce Sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emissions. 
Based on EPA’s statistics, ARP had successfully “decreased annual SO2 and NOx 
emissions by more than 40 percent in 2006 (p. 47).” The ARP had 2 phases. Phase I was 
from 1995 to 1999 and included 110 large SO2 emitters (EPA, 2011). Phase II began in 2000 
and included all emitters with a 25 megawatts capacity or greater (EPA, 2011). 
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3.1.2 European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme 
EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) was the first to launch a large 
emission-trading framework that regulated greenhouse gases in 2005. The ETS covers 45 
percent of EU GHG emissions and 31 countries have participated in the framework (IETA, 
2015). Under the regulation from the European Commissions, the ETS was divided into 
several phases, each with distinct successes. 
Phase 1 was from 2005 to 2007. Phase 1 established a price for carbon and promoted 
free trade of allowances across EU (IETA, 2015). The Commission also started to build a 
monitoring, reporting and verification system and infrastructure across the EU (IETA, 2015). 
Phase 2 was from 2008 to 2012 (IETA, 2015). Phase 2 included more gas emissions and 
more countries (IETA, 2015). The emission cap was lower and auctions were encouraged 
(IETA, 2015). The penalty was created and many other features were established as well 
(IETA, 2015). Phase 3 was from 2013 to 2020 (IETA, 2015). More gas emissions were 
included in ETS in Phase 3 (IETA, 2015). A single EU-wide cap was created to replace the 
old caps for each country (IETA, 2015). More instruments were created to encourage 
renewable energy development (IETA, 2015). 
 
3.1.3 California’s Cap and Trade Program 
California’s Cap-and-Trade program was created a year later than the EU ETS in 2006. 
However, the program did not start until 2013. Seven major emission areas were included in 
the program: energy, transportation, agriculture, water, waste management, and natural and 
working lands (ICAP, 2015). Like the EU ETS’ phases, California’s cap-and-trade program 
has a timeline as well. It is the called compliance period (ICAP, 2015). Therefore, the first 
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compliance period was from 2013-2014 (ICAP, 2015). The second compliance period is 
from 2015 to 2017 (ICAP, 2015). The third compliance period is from 2018-2020 (ICAP, 
2015). 
In the first compliance period, firms and industries that emit more than 25,000 tons of 
carbon dioxide per year were required to participate the program (ICAP, 2015). California 
also linked with Quebec’s emissions trading system in the beginning of 2014 (ICAP, 2015). 
In the second compliance period, California CAP included other emissions from 
transportation fuels and retail sales of natural gas (ICAP, 2015). About 85 percent of 
California’s GHG were included in the program (ICAP, 2015). The goal was simple: to 
reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 (ICAP, 2015). Here is the framework 
summary for EU ETS and CA CAP. 
 
3.1.4 Setup of the Program 
The ARP was established in response to the 1990 Clean Air Act. The phase I of the program 
was from 1995 to 1999. The goal was to decrease sulfur dioxide emissions to 50 percent of 
1980 levels. For phase II of the program, which began in 2000 and is ongoing, the goal is to 
have an absolute cap of 8.95 million tons emitted per year. 
The EU ETS emission target for 2020 is 20 percent below 1990 GHG levels (IETA, 
2015). For 2030, the emission target is at least 40 percent below 1990 GHG levels. Emission 
types for EU ETS are shown in Table. 2. CAT’s emission target is similar to EU ETS: return 
to 1990 GHG levels by 2020 (ICAP, 2015). For 2040, the goal is a 40 percent reduction from 
1990 GHG levels. There are more emission types in the CAT goals than there are in the EU 
ETS (ICAP, 2015). Besides the gases shown in the table. 2, CAT also regulates methane 
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(CH4), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), HFCs, nitrogen tri-fluoride (NF3) and other fluorinated 
GHGs (ICAP, 2015). 
 
Table 2:  Regulation Emission Type in 
both ETS 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 
Nitrous Oxide (N2O) 
per-fluorocarbons (PFCs) 
Source: IETA, 2015. Organized by author. 
The primary reason for regulating other greenhouse gases is because these gases will expose 
us to global warming. Even though carbon dioxide (CO2) is commonly known for the cause 
of such effect, other gases such as nitrous oxide (N2O) are also hazardous for human health. 
 
3.1.5 Covered Sectors 
The APR only covers coal-burning power plants. Both ETS and CAT cover an important 
sector: energy. As energy production often creates massive emissions, covering this sector 
would help to maximize the emission reduction efforts. The ETS also covers industries such 
as paper and construction, commercial aviation, and other chemical production (IETA, 
2015). For CAT, other six major emission sectors were included: energy, transportation, 
agriculture, water, waste management, and natural and working lands (ICAP, 2015). 
 
3.1.6 Distribution of Permits 
For ARP, the allocation method was purely grandfathering and only 2.8 percent of 
allowances were auctioned every year. The baseline year was from 1985 to 1987. For both 
schemes, the allocation method was dynamic. During the phase 1 (2005-2007) of the EU 
ETS, firms received their permits freely through grandfathering distribution (IETA, 2015). 
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Few permits were auctioned and benchmarked in some member states (IETA, 2015). During 
phase 2 (2008-2012) of the EU ETS, auctions and benchmarks were used in a small scale and 
the remaining permits were distributed through grandfathering (IETA, 2015). During phase 3 
(2013-2020) of the EU ETS, 40 percent of total allowances were auctioned (IETA, 2015). 
The electricity, manufacturing and aviation sectors have different regulations (IETA, 2015). 
Benchmarks were widely used and free permits were limited (IETA, 2015). 
 For California’s CAT, all compliance periods (1 and 2) were using benchmarks in 
every sector (ICAP, 2015). “Publicly owned and regulated investor-owned electric utilities 
receive allowances on behalf of their ratepayers. Industrial facilities receive free allowances 
for transition assistance and prevention of leakage. The remainder of allowances is 
auctioned” (ICAP, p.13, 2015). 
 ETS used a smooth approach for allocation method. Due to lack of emission data in 
the early phase of ETS, ETS used grandfathering to distribute permits. Starting in phase 2, 
benchmarks and auctioning played a more important role, which essentially led to a stable 
system. CAT was in a different scenario. Since California had detailed emission data from 
most participants, it was easy to start with the benchmark method and then gradually increase 
shares of auctioning. Since ARP had detailed emission data from participants, EPA used the 
grandfathering method to distribute permits. 
	  
3.1.7 Offsets Features 
ARP did not allow any offsets. It was mainly because the program only regulates coal-
burning power plants. In contrast, ETS and CAT have offsets since both programs regulate 
various industries. ETS has an offset to help promote smooth emission reductions. Offsets 
are only allowed to use between 2008 and 2020 (IETA, 2015). Firms that have reduced their 
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emissions by more than 50 percent, compared to 2005 levels, are allowed to use credits from 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and others that were 
established in the Kyoto Protocol (IETA, 2015). “Unlimited banking of allowances was also 
allowed in Phase II and III (IETA, 2015, p.11).” Borrowing is not allowed in the EU ETS. 
 For California, firms are only able to offset 8 percent of their total emissions (ICAP, 
2015). California has created many offsets programs, such as early-action offsets, 
international sector-based offsets, and ARB offset credits, to help promote smooth emission 
reductions as well (ICAP, 2015). Banking and borrowing are both allowed but are subject to 
holding limits (ICAP, 2015). 
 
3.1.8 Monitoring and Enforcement 
ARP has its own unique monitoring regulations. All power plants in the program must install 
a continuous emission monitoring (CEM) system to verify compliance. Participants must 
report their hourly emission data to EPA quarterly through the Internet (EPA, 2011). 
Moreover, EPA developed an emission tracking system that requires all participants to record 
their emissions transactions, and record it in the online database (EPA, 2011). The penalty 
was $2,000 (USD)  per ton of SO2 emission if “a regulated source exceeds its SO2 allowances 
(Napolitano et al., 2007, p.50).”  
Both Europe and California have feasible plans for monitoring and enforcement. EU 
ETS has a monitoring plan for every installation and aviation sector (IETA, 2015). Firms in 
the ETS will self-report emissions annually (IETA, 2015). A third-party verifier ensures that 
the reported data are accurate before March each year and reports to the central agency 
(IETA, 2015). The central agency will then record the data and plan for the following year’s 
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allowance distribution and cap (IETA, 2015). If firms did not comply or emitted more than 
they were permitted to, a €100 per ton penalty is applied (IETA, 2015). The name of the firm 
will be published (IETA, 2015). Besides the central penalty, each state in European Union 
also has series of penalty to punish firms who ignore the rules (IETA, 2015). 
 California follows similar regulations as well. The reporting frequency is also annual 
(ICAP, 2015). A third independent party is required to verify the emission data. But only 
firms that emit 25,000 or more tons of CO2 are required to hire a third party to verify the data 
(ICAP, 2015). The “Operator also must implement internal audits, quality assurance and 
control systems for the reporting program and the data reported (ICAP, p.12, 2015).” 
California also has series penalties for violators. Failing to submit emission reporting or 
emitting excess greenhouse gases will result in serious fines, up to $1000 per day and up to 
$1,000,000 for intentional violations, and violators may even be jailed up to a year (ICAP, 
2015). 
 There are many differences in these three systems as well. For example, the scope 
coverage is quite similar but not completely the same between ETS and CAT. ARP only 
focuses on coal-burning power plants. ETS focuses on the power sector, heavy industries, 
chemical production and commercial aviation. CAT focuses on agriculture, water, waste 
management, energy and transportation. Even though both frameworks focus on GHGs, 
emission types are not the same as well. ETS is more centered on Carbon Dioxide (CO2), 
Nitrous Oxide (N2O), and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). CAT also concentrated on CO2 and 
PFCs but fluorinated GHGs were also added in the scope. On the other hand, ARP only 
focused on SO2. The next section will dive into three main categories of an emission-trading 
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scheme: allocation method, reinforcement mechanism, and price volatility and secondary 
market.  
  
3.2 Allocation Method Discussion 
Allocation is a key design in an emission trade system. It not only provides statistics for 
setting up the emission cap of the system but also influences the permit price during trading. 
There are two major allocation methods in the current emission trade systems: grandfathering 
and benchmarking. In grandfathering, the regulator issues free tradable permits based on 
either historical emissions or on historical emissions intensity (Ernst & Young, 2014). On the 
other hand, benchmarks are based on the best-performing firm in each industry, whose 
emissions serve as the standard for others in the same industry (Zetterberg, 2014). 
Over-allocation was commonly agreed in the phase I of the EU ETS (Ellerman & 
Buchner, 2007; Anderson & Di Maria, 2011). Ellerman and Buchner (2007) provided a 
simple method to show over-allocation and over-estimate abatement efforts in the phase I of 
the EU ETS. Based on historical data of 2005 and 2006, they compare the total number of 
over-allocated and under-allocated allowance with overall distributed allowance in each state 
in EU ETS (Ellerman & Buchner, 2007). Despite economic growth and the rising trend of oil 
and natural gas prices in EU states, they found that “2005 and 2006 emissions were actually 
lower than historical baselines even though allowance were over-distributed by 3 percent 
(Ellerman & Buchner, p, 86, 2007).” Moreover, they used other variables to show that EU 
emissions were reduced significantly, “roughly between 130 and 220 million tons in each 
year, which is between 2 percent and 5 percent of covered emissions (Ellerman & Buchner, p, 
90, 2007).”  
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 Anderson and Di Maria (2011) arrive at a similar conclusion using a different method. 
They used the dynamic panel estimation by adding factors of European industrial emissions, 
industrial economic activity levels, weather effects, and energy prices to estimate the counter 
factual (business-as-usual) emissions scenario for EU states (Anderson & Di Maria, 2011). 
As they compare their results with historical allocated emission, their conclusion follows 
Ellerman and Buchner (2007) that both over-allocation and abatement occurred, and the 
estimated over-allocation was about 280 million tons of carbon dioxide between 2005 and 
2007 (Anderson & Di Maria, 2011). 
 The benchmark-based allocation method was largely deployed in phase III of the EU 
ETS. Sartor, Palliere and Lecourt (2014) provided an assessment of using benchmarking 
method in EU ETS. Sartor, Palliere and Lecourt (2014) used the collected data from phase I 
and II and compared them with phase III, a period of using benchmarking to help firms 
allocating free allowance. At first, they found that phase III free allocation levels fell 
significantly, and benchmarking had reduced risk for windfall gains by firms and 
simultaneously lowered carbon leakage risks (Sartor, Palliere & Lecourt, 2014). 
Overall, the benchmark method provides the potential for a more equitable system 
than grandfathering because it is more consistent with the future demand and provides 
greater incentives for emission reduction. Most importantly, the benchmark method offers a 
consistent method for both new entrants and existing facilities and often rewards early action. 
In contrast, grandfathering offers a universal standard for all participants. In some sectors, the 
grandfathering method is preferred due to the complexity of calculating the diversity of 
products and variables. However, current trends from both emissions trading systems suggest 
that the benchmark method is more commonly used. 
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3.3 Reinforcement Mechanism (MRV) Discussion 
When constructing an emissions trading system, it is necessary to make sure that the 
regulator creates mechanisms to track the progress and effectiveness of the trading system. 
Normally, such mechanisms contains three main functions: measurement, reporting and 
verification; such a mechanism is often called the MRV system. Measurement or monitoring 
is often recorded and calculated by the firm. After reported to the central agency, the agency 
will verify the data and make a future emission reduction plan. A Measurement, Report and 
Verification system can help to value the effectiveness of the emissions trading system 
(Bellassen et al., 2015). Based on the collected data, a regulator may see the emission 
reduction scales in firms and adjust current or future emission reduction plan (Bellassen et al., 
2015). 
Both EU ETS and CA CAT used a similar MRV method to help to monitor the 
system. Both emissions trading systems use certified third parties to help to monitor 
emissions of firms with the sole distinction that while only large firms (i.e. those that emit 
more than 10,000 tons of CO2 per annually) needed to comply with the law, all emissions 
trading scheme firms had to undergo verification). Then, why did both emission-trading 
schemes choose a third-party verifier? What are the benefits of MRV and what are the best 
standards for an effective MRV? 
 Bellassen et al. (2015) proposed a comparative analysis on a monitoring, reporting 
and verifying mechanism in the current and past carbon pricing management. By comparing 
key designs in 15 carbon pricing and management mechanisms, they found that current 
MRVs often neglect small-scale emission firms and constantly provide biased reporting due 
to emission uncertainty (Bellassen et al., 2015). According to IPCC, uncertainty refers to the 
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“difference between the estimate (or reported) and the actual value (actual emission),” which 
is the key factor to test the effectiveness of an emission trade system (Bellassen et al., 2015). 
Bellassen et al., (2015) also focused on the economies of scale of MRV, verification and 
materiality, which means that MRV focuses more on larger numbers. They found that MRV 
costs decrease with size and phenomena such as materiality. Therefore, Bellassen et al. (2015) 
conclude that emission uncertainty is hard to eliminate when monitoring smaller scale firms 
and provided recommendations for future design (Schakenbach, Vollaro & Forte, 2006). 
 Instead of reviewing carbon emission trade systems, Schakenbach, Vollaro and Forte 
(2006) reviewed the U.S. Acid Rain Program (ARP) and nitrogen oxide Budget Trading 
Programs (NBTP). They found that the key success of a MRV system is data accuracy and 
strict quality-assurance requirements in the system design (Schakenbach, Vollaro & Forte, 
2006). Furthermore, the MRVs in both programs concentrated on program development and 
maintenance (Schakenbach, Vollaro & Forte, 2006). Several reasons behind the success of 
these two programs were given: “compliance assurance through incentives and automatic 
penalties, and strong QA (quality control) (Schakenbach, Vollaro & Forte, 2006, p.1577).” 
The program benefited from a strong enforcement system and such a system would assure 
strong quality control (Schakenbach, Vollaro & Forte, 2006). Since all participants have 
followed the instructions and compliance they had agreed on, the ARP went extremely well 
(Schakenbach, Vollaro & Forte, 2006). Schakenbach, Vollaro and Forte (2006) also 
suggested that continuously implementing these strict MRV requirements would benefit the 
program and preserve long-term success in emission reductions. As these authors have 
provided detailed concerns towards various MRV systems, it is essential to create an 
effective MRV system to promote data accuracy. 
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3.4. Price Volatility and Secondary Market  
The allowances or permits, which were allocated by firms, are tradable among emitters so 
that firms may “equalize their costs of compliance at the margin and thereby achieve the 
environmental goal at least total cost (Raymond & Shively, 2008).” Low-cost emitters, who 
may reduce emissions cheaply, can sell their allowances to large emitters to trade off the cost, 
and vice versa. 
Both emissions trading systems do not have mechanisms to regulate the price of 
permits in the secondary market, which can lead to price volatility. The allowance’s price 
volatility is an important indicator to reflect marginal abatement costs (Hintermann, 2012). 
Since price volatility can inhibit trades, it is essential to understand its drivers. 
 Creti, Jouvet and Mignon (2012) revealed the key factors that energy sources and 
weather conditions determine allowance price in EU ETS during phase I and phase II 
(Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo & Valor, 2007). As market agents and other scholars believe that 
energy source and weather conditions are the main elements of changing allowance price, 
Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo and Valor (2007) proposed an empirical analysis on energy sources, 
which are oil, natural gas and coal prices, and weather conditions’ influence on the daily 
permits price in 2005. Based on their model, they found that the main cause of CO2 price 
changes was natural gas prices (Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo & Valor, 2007). By drawing 
weather-influencing examples from Germany, Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo and Valor’s results 
suggest that only extreme weather conditions may affect the daily price of CO2 (2007). 
 However, Lutz, Pigorsch and Rotfu proposed a macroeconomic analysis on energy 
source and weather’s influence on EUA’s (European Union Allowance Units) price in EU 
ETS, and they found no connection with the weather factor (2013). Lutz, Pigorsch and Rotfu 
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(2013) proposed a Markov regime switching GARCH model to observe the relationship 
between EUA prices and its fundamentals, such as oil prices. They used the daily closing 
EUA prices from 2008 to 2013 (Lutz, Pigorsch & Rotfu, 2013). Their regression results 
identified a low and high volatility regime and reveal that gas price and stock market had 
positive impacts on EUA prices in both regimes (Lutz, Pigorsch & Rotfu, 2013). 
 Koch et al. (2014) opposed Lutz, Pigorsch and Rotfu (2007) and Creti, Jouvet and 
Mignon (2012), and proposed a policy approach focusing on climate policies and renewable 
development during the transaction period. Koch et al. (2014) focused on three criteria: 
economic recession, renewable policies and the use of international credits. Koch et al. (2014) 
used Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo & Valor’s (2007) model but used an Ordinary Least Squares 
regression to observe the relationships between fuel prices, economic activity, renewable 
development and international offsets. Their results show that “abatement cost of fuels are 
not necessary reflecting the EUA prices; plus, economic recessions and renewable energy 
development had significant impacts on EUA prices (Koch et al., p. 677, 2014).” According 
to Koch et al.’s findings, only 10 percent of the variations of EUA price changes were 
determined by fuel prices changes (2014). The remaining 90 percent was still unclear and, 
therefore, Koch et al. (2014) conclude that “abatement-related fundamentals are not clear to 
fully explain the EUA price volatility” and they reject the idea that weather changes 
influence EUA prices (p, 677).  
 To address price volatility, McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002) propose a hybrid policy 
(McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002). In their design, regulators can set a price floor and price 
ceiling through buying back excessive permits and selling additional permits to control price 
volatility (McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002). The ceiling and floor effectively act like a tax, 
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allowing the regulator to combine the two policy instruments, taxes and permits, into a 
hybrid instrument. 
 Through the papers above, many important aspects were discussed and compared in 
EU ETS and CA CAT. As both emissions trading systems are running quite successfully, 
these aspects could provide significant lessons for China to modify its current trading pilot 
projects and establish a national emissions trading system. The next chapter will discuss the 
status quo of the Chinese regional pilot projects and then analyze the mistakes that were 
made in them. 
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Chapter 4: Lessons from the Pilots Programs 
Many analysts have deemed the seven pilot projects in China unsuccessful for several 
reasons (Munnings et al., 2014; Lo & Howes, 2014; Xiong et al., 2015). There are many 
explanations for this outcome. The price is relatively stable in many pilot projects but permit 
trades were still in a slow process, meaning the liquidity of the market is still low (Munnings 
et al., 2014). The government has absolute control of the market, which created power 
asymmetry and a hierarchical relationship within the system and is thus unable to bring 
players from both private and public financial sectors (Lo & Howes, 2014). In addition, even 
though many innovations have been introduced, most of the pilot projects are unable to 
provide transactional transparency and data clarity so that local and international 
communities cannot track the emission reduction efforts (Xiong et al., 2015). Allowance 
oversupply is also a problem that is causing the regional ETS to be less productive. Finally, 
and most importantly, the seven pilot projects are unable to influence the national energy 
portfolio and carbon emissions (Xiong et al., 2015). 
However, these pilot projects may provide useful experience to develop a national 
emissions trading scheme, and can potentially reshape firms’ behaviors and attitudes toward 
energy consumption and carbon emissions (Jiang et al., 2016). Therefore, this chapter will 
discuss challenges for the Chinese regional pilot projects in four perspectives: allocation 
method, MRV challenges, other issues that have lagged these pilot projects, and political 
barriers. 
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4.1 Allocation Method Challenges 
The most common method for allocating permits in these pilot projects is the historical 
emission method. The public auction method is also used or considered  to be used in 
Shanghai, Guangdong, Shenzhen, and Tianjing (Wu, 2012). Overall, free distribution is the 
main theme in the seven pilot projects. Tietenberg brought several advantages for free 
allocation based on many successful U.S. emission-trading systems. Free allocation involves 
a smaller financial burden to small participants in the regional pilot projects (Tietenberg, 
2006). This means that free distribution would increase the likelihood of adoptions for firms 
(Tietenberg, 2006). This approach also helps to protect firms who had invested in resource 
extraction (Tietenberg, 2006). It will also attract potential future emitters to the system 
(Tietenberg, 2006). Most importantly, free distribution helps to build the necessary political 
support to enforce the system (Tietenberg, 2006). 
However, some of these advantages would not function as originally structured under 
China’s economic and political structure. In most pilot projects, small emitters were excluded 
from the system. One reason is that small emitter’s emissions were excluded when 
calculating the regional emissions due to an excessive number of firms. As small emitters 
have minimum impacts to a regional emissions trading scheme, there are no advantages for 
them to participate in the emissions trading system. Furthermore, large emitters, such as the 
electricity sector and steel sector, are mostly state owned or controlled. In that sense, these 
firms will automatically join the emissions trading scheme. 
Political support is an unnecessary element in China’s circumstances as well. Since 
the Chinese Communist Party has absolute control of the government, public opinions would 
have minimum impacts on governmental regulations. Political enforcement is exceptionally 
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strong in China. The only reason for the lack of carbon market development is because 
emissions trading is not the prioritized target for the Chinese government. Overall, 
Tietenberg’s conclusions are better suited for a democratic, market economy and these may 
not apply to China to the same degree. 
As mentioned before, the historical emission method raises concerns because firms 
may manipulate their historical emission data. When the pilot projects tried to determine the 
total emission cap and emission reduction targets, only few firms had complete historical 
emission data (Liu et al., 2015). The accuracy in quota allocation could have a large impact 
when calculating future emissions (Liu et al., 2015). The advantage of using the historical 
emission method would be to distribute excessive permits in the initial stage. 
However, too many distributed permits would lower the price, which would fail the 
emission reduction intention (Sun et al., 2016). This is exactly what happened in the regional 
pilot projects. From figure 2, the data show the lower carbon price in most pilot projects 
since 2014. Carbon prices in all pilots show a decreasing trend except Beijing’s carbon 
market, which stays above 40 yuan (5.7 USD) most of the time. Shenzhen’s pilot market 
started above 50 yuan (7.1 USD) in the beginning and then decreased at a constant rate and 
eventually stayed between 30 yuan (4.2 USD) and 40 yuan (5.7 USD). Shanghai’s and 
Guangdong province’s pilot projects show a similar pattern. Both markets’ prices decrease at 
a constant rate but skyrocketed in the beginning of the 2017. Overall, carbon prices in most 
pilot projects are in the 20 Yuan (2.85 Dollar) range most of the time. 
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Figure 5. Beijing Carbon Market Price since November 2013. Source: Chinese Carbon 
Trade Net, 2016. 
 
Figure 6: Shanghai Carbon Market Price since November 2013. Source: Chinese Carbon 
Trade Net, 2016. 
  
34 
 
Figure 7. Guangdong Province Carbon Market Price since November 2013.  Source: 
Chinese Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
 
Figure 8. Tianjin Carbon Market Price since November 2013. Source: Chinese Carbon 
Trade Net, 2016. 
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Figure 9. Shenzhen Carbon Market Price for 2013 Permit since November 2013. Source: 
Chinese Carbon Trade Net, 2016.  
 
Figure 10. Shenzhen Carbon Market Price for 2014 Permit since 2014. Source: Chinese 
Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
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Figure 11. Shenzhen Carbon Market Price for 2015 Permit since 2015. Source: Chinese 
Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
 
Figure 12. Hubei Province Carbon Market Price since November 2013. Source: Chinese 
Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
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Figure 13. Chongqing Carbon Market Price since November 2013. Source: Chinese Carbon 
Trade Net, 2016. 
 
On one hand, low carbon prices in most pilot projects are potentially caused by over-
allocation. As mentioned above, distributing excessive permits would result in a lower 
carbon price. On the other hand, a high emission cap in those pilot projects also can lead to 
over-allocation in most pilot projects. Shenzhen’s pilot caps were the same in 2013 and 2014: 
33 million tons of carbon. In 2015, the cap increased to 35 million tons of carbon (China 
Energy Saving Network, 2017). Shanghai’s pilot caps were the same between 2013 and 2015: 
160 million tons of carbon (China Energy Saving Network, 2017). Beijing’s pilot did not 
disclose the cap but the estimates showed it was about 45 million tons of carbon between 
2013 and 2015 (China Energy Saving Network, 2017). Tianjing’s pilot cap is the same as 
Shanghai’s cap between 2013 and 2015: 160 million tons of carbon (China Energy Saving 
Network, 2017). Guangdong Province’s pilot cap has been about 388 million tons of carbon 
since 2013 (China Energy Saving Network, 2017). These pilot projects’ caps maintained 
same level from 2013 to 2015 (China Energy Saving Network, 2017). Considering the fact 
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that the carbon price in those pilot projects stay relatively low, from 20 yuan (2.85 USD) to 
40 yuan (5.7 USD), over-allocation would be an explanation for the phenomenon. 
Nonetheless, only Chongqing pilot showed a decreasing cap. The cap was 125 million 
tons of carbon in 2013 and decreased to 116 million tons of carbon in 2014 (China Energy 
Saving Network, 2017). In 2015, the number decreased again to 106 million tons of carbon 
(China Energy Saving Network, 2017). Even though the cap was decreasing in Chongqing, 
low secondary-market trading volume shows over-allocation in the pilot projects. From 2013 
to 2017, only 730 thousand tons of carbon were traded (China Energy Saving Network, 
2017). This is about 0.8 percent of total trading in all 7 pilot projects in the last five years. If 
firms in the pilot did not receive excessive amounts of permits, trading volume would be 
higher and the carbon price would be higher. 
However, there are exceptions. The Hubei pilot showed a decreasing cap since 2014 
and maintained high levels of market transaction (China Energy Saving Network, 2017). The 
cap for Hubei pilot projects in 2014 was 324 million tons of carbon and was 281 million tons 
of carbon in 2015 (China Energy Saving Network, 2017). The cap decreased about 13 
percent (China Energy Saving Network, 2017). At the same time, 34 million tons of carbon 
permits were traded between 2014 to 2017 in the Hubei pilot (China Energy Saving Network, 
2017). This is about 40 percent of total trading across all 7 pilot projects (China Energy 
Saving Network, 2017). 
 
4.2 Monitoring, Reporting, Verification (MRV) Challenges  
MRV is a mechanism, including emission measurement, emission reporting, and report 
verification, that ensures a functional carbon trading system (Shen, 2013). As shown in all 
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pilot projects, most pilot projects decided to have a third party to help process MRV. Yet 
even with a third party, the transparency of the reporting is in doublet. For example, the 
government usually picks local firms as third parties to do MRV since a local enterprise is 
more familiar with pilot participants (Shen, 2013). But, these local, government-preferred 
firms are normally connected with the government and therefore will create biased data 
(Shen, 2013) Therefore, it is uncertain that the data will truly represent the actual emissions 
(Shen, 2013). 
 Independent third party data verifiers may not be the reliable source to verify firms’ 
emission data. In most cases, emitters often establish a verifier company to verify emitters’ 
own emission data, which means that the firm is able to manipulate the emission data. Often, 
firms may report excessive allowances to the central agency for the next year and will not 
implement any efforts to reduce emissions. On the other hand, there is no enforcement after 
the verifier. There is no punishment for false reporting or manipulating emission data. No 
sufficient regulations will lead a chaotic MRV process and eventually, will hold back the 
emissions trading system as a whole. 
 Wu, Qian & Li (2014) also expressed concerns about data quality from MRV. For 
example, the Shanghai pilot never revealed historical data or sector emission data to the 
public; therefore, the public could not track emission reductions (Wu, Qian & Li, 2013). Not 
only in Shanghai but also in other pilot projects, the emission data are shown differently from 
the official statistics and third parties’ reports (Wu, Qian & Li, 2013). The data inconsistency 
will also harm cap-setting and permit allocation since most pilot projects used historical 
emission allocation method. 
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 In addition, data transparency and clarity are also problematic in the regional pilot 
projects. No emission data were disclosed to the public and no allowance data were 
publicized from the government. The lack of data transparency would essentially cost these 
regional pilot projects’ emission reduction impartiality. As data transparency is an important 
tool to value the emission reduction of an emissions trading scheme in theory, it is hard to tell 
if firms are reducing emissions since the cap remains unchanged in most pilot projects. On 
the other hand, private investors would have difficulty identifying potential targets for 
investment. Since no data are available for the public sectors, investors are conservative 
toward the carbon trading market, which will not help to develop a healthy carbon trading 
market. 
 
4.3 Secondary Market and Enforcement Problems 
Secondary markets in the regional pilot projects are problematic and chaotic. The emissions 
trading system was invented to generate profits and environmental protection tools for firms 
through permits trading (Tietenberg, 2006). Without any sufficient enforcement system, 
firms are unlikely to comply (Tietenberg, 2006). “Insufficient monitoring and enforcement 
could also result in failure to keep a tradable permit system within its environmental limit. 
(Tietenberg, 2006, p.3)” This is exactly what happened in the regional pilot projects systems. 
Across the seven pilot projects, only three pilot projects, Hubei province, Guangdong 
province and Shenzhen, maintain high volume of permits trading in the last four years. 
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing pilot projects only traded 17 percent of the total 
trading since 2013 (China Carbon Trading Net, 2017). Figure 7 clearly shows the trading 
percentage for each pilot. The total trading volume for Chongqing pilot from last four years 
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is only 734,000 tons of carbon (China Carbon Trading Net, 2017). Tianjin pilot only traded 
roughly 1.8 million tons of carbon (China Carbon Trading Net, 2017). Beijing pilot traded 
roughly 4.8 million tons of carbon (China Carbon Trading Net, 2017). All three pilot projects 
maintained a low trading volume. If we connect with the data from Figure 2, carbon prices 
are also 
 
Figure 14: Total carbon transactions in secondary market. Source: China Carbon Trading Net, 2017. 
generally lower in the Tianjin and Chongqing pilot projects. Unlike these three cities, the 
Shenzhen pilot project maintained a relatively active market, and transactions are higher than 
the three cities combined. It is because that Shenzhen distributed all three-year permits to 
firms at once. Firms are able to trade their 2013, 2014, and 2015 permits, which essentially 
increased the transaction volumes in the pilot projects. 
 Hubei province pilot and Guangdong province pilot have more active secondary 
markets, statistically. Guangdong traded roughly 21 million tons of carbon and Hubei traded 
around 34 million tons of carbon in the last four years (China Carbon Trading Net, 2017). 
The reasons behind the scene are the scale of the pilot projects and also policy enforcement. 
More firms have participated in these two provincial pilot projects and therefore, more 
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carbon trading occurred. Plus, there are more state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in these two 
pilot projects. Since SOEs are regulated by the central government, carbon-trading policies 
are easier to cross through bricks at the local level. Therefore, these two pilot projects’ 
markets are more active than any others. 
 
 
Figure 15: Beijing Total Traded Permits since 2013 vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: Chinese 
Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
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Figure 16: Guangdong Total Traded Permits since 2013 vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: 
Chinese Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
 
Another perspective to look at the secondary market is to compare the total traded 
permits and the total cap. Both Figure 8 and Figure 9 compare the total traded permits from 
the last four years and one-year cap from each pilot. Translating into percentage, Beijing 
traded about 10.7 percent and Guangdong traded about 5.5 percent. Turn these statistics into 
a larger picture, assuming the cap remains the same for four years, Beijing then only traded 
2.6 percent and Guangdong traded about 1.3 percent of its permits in the last four years.  
 The secondary markets in the city pilot projects commonly share same characteristic: 
low market liquidity. As mentioned above, all cities maintained low trading volume and 
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firms tend to hold their permits. This could mean that firms had implemented and invested 
emission reduction tools so that they do not need to trade any permits. Low compliance rate 
is common in most pilot projects. Shanghai, for example, had a 36 percent compliance rate in 
2014 and a 67 percent compliance rate in 2015 (China Carbon Trading Net, 2017). This 
means that nearly half of the firms in the pilot projects were not able to reduce the amount of 
emission they had agreed to when they joined the emissions trading scheme. This also means 
that stronger enforcement policies are needed for the regional pilot projects. 
Theoretically, facilities in emissions trading schemes would “control their emissions 
and sell excess permits, thereby providing an adequate supply (Tietenberg, 2006, p.7).” 
However, firms in the regional pilot projects often choose to install emission reduction tools 
to stay in compliance, or simply ignore the policy (Tietenberg, 2006). As the compensation 
amount is normally low, firms would ignore the regulation and pay the penalty since it is 
cheaper (Zhao et al., 2016). For those who chose to comply, they did not go above and 
beyond the line and create excessive permits to sale. One reason is that over-distribution had 
generated incentives for firms to do less. Another reason is that firms are unfamiliar with the 
policy, so they are very conservative and are not willing to sell their allowances back to the 
market. 
Many investors’ intend to participate into the carbon market to earn profits. In many 
other emissions trading systems, individual and institutional investors would help to promote 
transactions and carbon market activity. However, as the market liquidity is quite low in most 
pilot projects, investors are able to manipulate permit prices and earn profits. Firms that 
participated in the pilot projects have to pay more to increase their holdings. As a result, 
carbon price would not reflect the true value and pilot projects participants face higher prices 
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(Zhao et al., 2016). Furthermore, only a small number of firms are able to participate in most 
pilot projects. 
 
4.4 Political Barrier Challenge  
Political barriers have failed the  pilot projects program. There is a lack of legislation for the 
administrative supervision and control and the operation of trading markets in most pilot 
projects (Liu et al., 2015). Only the Shenzhen pilot has legislative power and many pilot 
projects are not connected with legal system (Liu et al., 2015). As a penalty policy is crucial 
to make a carbon trading market sufficient, the lack of legislative rights in many pilot 
projects can make the system fail (Liu et al., 2015). As shown the Table 1, all pilot projects 
have penalties to punish emission violations. However, there are no standardized rules, and 
the lack of penalty enforcement would be problematic for these pilot projects (Liu et al., 
2015). 
 Even though the 7 pilot projects are led and managed by NDRC and other 
departments, there is still a lack of details of the specific division of work across agencies, 
distinction in rights and obligations, and coordination and cooperation in the management 
system (Liu et al., 2015). Moreover, NDRC has mostly focus on a clean development 
mechanism (CDM) and lacks carbon trading management experience (Liu et al., 2015). The 
government needs to separate its role of leader, rule maker and regulator in the carbon 
trading system in order to make it work (Liu et al., 2015). 
 The most important political barrier, however, is that local officials or cadres often 
promote economic growth to seek chances for their career advancement. In other words, 
local economic growth would bring cadres a higher chance for career promotion. Therefore, 
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economic growth is their priority target. A great example can be seen from the Politburo 
Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China (PSC)4. 7 out of 6 members of PSC 
including Xi Jinping had worked in coastal provinces, where are the most economic 
developed areas in China. Note the fact that these members were promoting high economic 
growth of costal area in the 2000s. It is inevitable to disclose the fact that high economic 
growth was an important factor that helped them to reach today’s career success. 
 
Figure 17: Local Governments’ Incentives and Urban Infrastructure Investments. Source: Wu et al., 
2013. 
Wu et al. interviewed 283 Chinese city mayors and party secretaries about career promotion 
and concluded that a cadre who leads massive local transportation investment would have a 
higher chance to be promoted compared to leading environmental infrastructure (2013). 
Local cadres often face dilemmas to balance economic growth and environmental protection. 
Figure 3 show the relationships of the environmental infrastructure investments, GDP growth, 
and career advancement. “One standard deviation increase in average GDP scaled 
                                                
4 PSC is the committee consisting major top leaders of CCP (Chinese Communist Party), including Xi Jinping. 
In other words, this committee has the highest authority and mandate to conduct any policy discussion and 
establish any policy. 
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environmental improvement investment lowers the probability of promotion by 8.5 
percentage points for secretaries and 6.3 percentage points for mayors (Wu et al., 2013, 
p.23).” Moreover, “one standard deviation increase in average GDP growth rate compared 
with predecessor raises the probability of promotion by 4.76 percentage points for secretaries 
and 10 percent points for mayors (Wu et al., 2013, p.22).”  
However, if a cadre put no efforts into increasing environmental amenities, there is no 
way he or she will be promoted. As the new Five-Year Plan (13th) stated, cadres who have no 
interests in promoting environmental amenities will not be promoted to the next level. This is 
a good sign of promoting environmental infrastructure growth since career advancement is 
the priority goal for local cadres. But, the scale of the growth would be questioned since 
environmental reform would lead less GDP growth. Balancing the dilemma would be the 
new challenge for local cadres.  
 As a lack of sufficient preparation and efficient system design, the Chinese seven 
pilot projects are still in the experimental stage. Plus, as most scholars pointed out, the pilot 
projects did not contribute much to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Pilots need many 
improvements in order to achieve the eventual goal. Therefore, the next section will provide 
insightful policy recommendations for the existing regional emissions trading scheme. 
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5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendation 
This thesis has identified a set of challenges for the regional Emissions trading systems. The 
goal for this chapter is to provide insightful and feasible policy recommendations as these 
schemes are scaled. It discusses two primary issues: allocation method and enforcement 
mechanisms. Other ideal recommendations will also be mentioned at the end. 
An emissions trading system is a complicated system, and it is hard to establish the 
system nationwide in the short term, especially in China where the provinces have diverse 
characteristics. More pilot studies in more regions are recommended to gather more data and 
get further experience. All the lessons learned from past experiences, both domestic and 
internationally, I believe China is able to establish an effective and efficient national 
emission system in the near future. 
The emissions trading system is an instrument designed to relax the tension between 
economic development and environmental sustainability. Although many enterprises 
currently consider that the system is against economic development because there is a limit 
for them to pollute, they will be used to the rules and find new opportunities for their 
industries to develop in a later stage. More specifically, with a rigid legal basis and a 
strengthened monitoring system in the future, the participating enterprises will have to follow 
the rules. Therefore, instead of seeking leakages in the law and considering pollution as the 
main pathway to develop, they will change their pathway, concentrating on using better 
technology to reduce the cost of pollution reduction or participating in the emissions trading 
markets to make profits. Plus, political support is also an essential element in China’s 
political environment. As China has committed to the Paris agreement, I believe further 
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support will be provided to promote national emissions trading system. Therefore, I am 
optimistic towards the national emissions trading system before 2020. 
 
5.1 Allocation Recommendation 
Use benchmark Approach to distribute permits. 
Over-allocation due to political pressures has proven a lack of efficiency and accuracy in 
most of China’s pilot projects. A benchmark and auction approach would solve the issue. 
Many scholars have indicated that auctioning allocation method will be the most efficient 
method to the regulatory agency in China’s scenario. Plus, auctioning will also help to set the 
permit price in the secondary market, which will truly indicate the marginal abatement cost 
for the participants. If we analyze the EU emissions trading scheme’s past experiences, it 
clearly shows a paradigm shift from grandfathering to a benchmark and auctioning approach. 
In phase 3 of the EU emissions trading scheme, auctioning plays an important role in 
allocation method. Nearly 40 percent of total allowances were auctioned. Benchmark is also 
an indicator to help regulate the allocation method. Since most firms in EU ETS have started 
to record their historical emission data prior 2006, EU ETS has a well-constructed database 
to rely on at present time. The regulatory agency will use the obtained data to establish 
further emission distributing regulations and estimate the emission cap more accurately. 
Compared to EU ETS, California cap-and-trade also took a similar allocation methods. Since 
they had constantly recorded firms’ emission data, they were able to start with the benchmark 
allocation method. Later, auctioning plays an active role in distribution allocation. About 25 
percent of the total allowance was auctioned to the participants. California was able to use 
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the generated revenue to invest in renewable energy development, transportation programs, 
and improve energy efficiency. 
For the Chinese regional emissions trading systems, pilot projects can definitely 
borrow the experiences from EU and California and construct a policy that suits China 
specifically. Three years of free distribution have helped China to construct a better and more 
accurate emission database for the current participants in each pilot. Regional pilot projects 
should able to use the obtained historical emission data to set the benchmark for each 
industry. Also, benchmark approach is easier to accept new participants in the emissions 
trading system. It creates fairness for existing participants and new participants. Once the 
benchmark is set, firms would acknowledge their responsibilities and is obligated to meet 
expected emission reduction goal. Transforming allocation to benchmark is also necessary 
for the regional pilot projects to construct a more efficient and sufficient emissions trading 
system. 
Use auction to distribute additional permits. 
China must also borrow California’s auctioning policy. It is not the first time that 
Chinese government has consulted expertise from other state. The government have 
consulted expertise from California’s electric vehicle program to set up Chinese EV policies 
in 2014 and 2015. Based on this circumstance, the Emissions trading program can also learn 
from the CAT. Auctions are held every three months and firms can buy the remaining unsold 
allowances from previous year. Two crucial mechanisms, clearing price and reserve price, 
are needed when setting the auction. Clearing price is defined as higher price bidder wins the 
bid. Reserve price is “a minimum dollar amount that the owner of an item for auction will 
accept as the winning bid. (Citation needed)” As California used an Internet platform to 
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process the auction, China should use a similar approach since the Internet is widely used 
nowadays. The auction should also be single-rounded and in a sealed-bid format. In this way, 
firms will often bid at a higher price than they had expected. 
Overall, the allocation method must change in the current regional pilot projects. 
Currently, free distribution has caused over-distribution and no emission reduction in many 
pilot projects. As China is planning to establish a national emissions trading system in the 
next three or four years, a thoroughly designed distribution mechanism is crucial to make the 
national emission system work. Or, China at least needs to start recording emission data in 
local areas and update it annually so that eventually, China can move further in the emissions 
trading system.  
 
5.2 Enforcement Mechanism 
The MRV (Monitoring, Reporting, and Verifying) and penalty system need significant 
improvements in current pilot projects. The MRV policy in all pilot projects is the same: self-
report to the agency annually and a third-party verifier would re-check the report and report 
to the government. As mentioned in Chapter 3 and 4, data quality and transparency were 
problematic in the regional emissions trading scheme. Plus, third party verifiers’ rules have 
left loopholes for firms to cheat. Furthermore, the lack of penalty enforcement and 
compliance is crucial to the existing emissions trading system. Therefore, further policy 
modifications are needed to address these issues. Therefore, I will address a recommendation 
on MRV based on the U.S. SO2 and NOx program from the past. 
 
Ensure Data Transparency  
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The key for the success of the U.S. SO2 and NOx program is the well-constructed MRV 
system. In the U.S. SO2 and NOx program, firms first choose their monitoring equipment and 
report to EPA, the regulatory agency. Then, EPA reviews the plan and provide feedback to 
the firm. As a result, firms’ equipment must conduct certified tests and send the results to 
EPA for approval. At the end, “facilities begin to monitor emissions and conduct ongoing 
quality assurance and quality control testing requirements. (Kruger & Egenhofer, 2006, p.3)” 
Facilities must report emissions to EPA quarterly and send feedbacks. 
 The highlights of such MRV system are reporting mechanisms and data transparency. 
EPA used various software to audit facilities “for potential discrepancies or issues to 
investigate (Kruger & Egenhofer, 2006, p.53).” These audits were able to review emissions 
data and examine the reports provided by firms (Kruger & Egenhofer, 2006). EPA also have 
field audits in local government to not only verify the MRV equipment in the facilities but 
also verify the data which was provided by the facility (Kruger & Egenhofer, 2006). As the 
U.S. ARP resulted significant air quality controls and emission reductions, ensuring the data 
transparency is inevitable in Chinese pilot program.  
 
Impose strict penalty and ensure data quality. 
The penalty system also needs to be strictly enforced to ensure the correct incentives for an 
emissions trading scheme. The U.S. SO2 and NOx program had strict penalty rules on 
excessive emissions or non-compliances. The EPA was able to establish rules to access both 
civil and criminal penalties (Kruger & Egenhofer, 2006). “With an automatic penalty that is 
significantly higher than market price for allowances, and with a liquid market for 
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allowances, there has been nearly one hundred percent compliance (Kruger & Egenhofer, 
2006, p.54).”  
 Data quality and transparency also contributed efforts to ensure the success of the U.S. 
SO2 and NOx program. All data were available online to the public and there were no 
confidentiality requirements (Kruger & Egenhofer, 2006). Public access to “emissions and 
trading data builds confidence in the environmental results of the program and provides an 
additional safeguard or incentive for compliance (Kruger & Egenhofer, 2006, p.54).” Non-
governmental organizations were able to use the emission data to verify participants’ 
emissions and help to supervise the system. 
 As mentioned earlier, Chinese regional pilot projects’ MRV system have many 
problems. One of the problems is that many facilities were not able to install equipment to 
monitor emissions. As learned from the U.S. SO2 and NOx program, the regulatory agency 
should create a universal equipment rule for all the facilities. Once all or most facilities 
installed the same equipment, the central agency would be able to manage and monitor the 
emission data accurately. Facilities in the pilot projects should also be able to report their 
emission data online and receive feedback from regulatory agency. As firms and the central 
agency are connected through this network, better communication will be created. As no 
emission data were disclosed to the public, there was no way for environmental NGOs and 
the public to help monitor the system. The regulatory agency should create an online 
database to display all emission data in the pilot projects.  
Data transparency is also problematic in most pilot projects. In the seven pilot 
projects, an independent third party is required to precede the verification process. Stricter 
rules must apply when identifying a third party. The third party should also upload its 
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verification results into the online database as well. However, the reality is that these third 
party verifiers may not always follow the rules and often find loopholes in the regulation. 
Showing the results to the public can be the first step to lead more stringent rules on these 
verifiers. As the public can compare the report and the verification results of firms, firms will 
be more serious and concerned about non-compliance. The U.S. SO2 and NOx program had 
nearly 100 percent compliance rate because of the data transparency. As a result, pilot 
participants would reach the same outcome in the close future. 
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Appendix A. Total Traded Permits from Last Four Years vs. One Year 
Untraded Permits (Assuming cap remains the same every year). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Hubei Total Traded Permits since 2013 vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: Chinese 
Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
 
 
Figure 19: Tianjin Total Traded Permits since 2013 vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: Chinese 
Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
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Figure 20: Chongqing Total Traded Permits since 2013 vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: 
Chinese Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Shanghai Total Traded Permits since 2013 vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: 
Chinese Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
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Figure 22: Shenzhen Total Traded Permits since 2013 vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: 
Chinese Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
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Appendix B. Average Trading per Year vs. One Year Untraded Permits 
(Assuming cap remains the same every year). 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Chongqing Average Traded Permits per Year vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: 
Chinese Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
 
 
Figure 24: Beijing Average Traded Permits per Year vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: 
Chinese Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
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Figure 25: Hubei Average Traded Permits per Year vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: Chinese 
Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Shenzhen Average Traded Permits per Year vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: 
Chinese Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
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Figure 27: Tianjin Average Traded Permits per Year vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: 
Chinese Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Shanghai Average Traded Permits per Year vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: 
Chinese Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
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Figure 29: Guangdong Average Traded Permits per Year vs. One Year Untraded Permits. Source: 
Chinese Carbon Trade Net, 2016. 
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